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Multiple hypothesis testing 
Peer performance 
Performance measurement 
a b s t r a c t 
We define the outperformance (resp. underperformance) of an investment fund as the percentage of 
funds in the peer universe for which the true performance of the focal fund is higher (resp. lower). We 
show that the p –values of the pairwise tests of equal performance can be used to obtain estimates of the 
out– and underperformance ratio that are robust to false discoveries – estimated alpha differentials for 
which the significance test has a low p –value while the true alpha is identical. When applied to hedge 
funds, we find that ranking funds on the outperformance ratio leads to a top quintile portfolio with a 
higher absolute and risk–adjusted performance than when the estimated alpha is used. 


















































Why does the estimated alpha of an investment fund differ
rom its peers? If the alpha of the peer funds is truly identical, esti-
ation error must be the driving factor in a frequentist approach. 1 
n their pioneer study, Barras et al. (2010) show how to accurately
stimate the portion of true positive alpha funds in the universe.
heir estimation approach exploits the properties of the discovery
ate approach of Storey (2002) to avoid the common pitfall of also
ssociating positive alpha to zero–alpha funds with a significant
stimated positive alpha. In peer performance evaluation, a simi-
ar problem arises when estimating the percentage of peer funds
hat are outperformed by the investment fund of interest. In fact,
he traditional approach to peer performance evaluation is to rank
unds based on their estimated alpha, and then use the percentile
anks to classify peer performance as outperformance or under-
erformance. By construction, this approach ignores the possibility
hat funds in the peer group can have the same alpha, and thus
ends to overestimate the outperformance and underperformance.
oreover, in the extreme case where all funds truly have the same
lpha, the percentile–rank rate of outperformance obtained using
he estimated alpha is a random number between zero and one,nd thus has no information value. 
∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: david.ardia@unine.ch (D. Ardia), kris.boudt@vub.be (K. Boudt). 
1 We refer to Pástor and Stambaugh (2002) for the alternative Bayesian approach 
here the peer performance of a fund corresponds to an analysis of the credible 







378-4266/© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. Since institutional and retail investors tend to increase their
ortfolio allocation to outperforming funds (see, e.g. , Fung et al.,
008 ), accounting for the presence of equal alpha among funds
n the peer group is of crucial importance to avoid false discov-
ries and inefficient capital allocation. In this paper, we recom-
end evaluating peer performance of a fund using three peer
erformance parameters, for which we propose a non–parametric
stimator that controls for false discoveries. Under the proposed
riple–layered peer performance evaluation framework, a fund can
xhibit three types of peer performance with respect to a universe:
i) equal–performance : the percentage composition of the peer uni-
erse in terms of funds that perform equally as well as the focal
und, 2 (ii) outperformance : the percentage of peer funds that under-
erform the focal fund, and (iii) underperformance : the percentage
f peer funds that outperform the focal fund. Throughout the pa-







here i is the index of the focal fund. 
The estimation of the peer performance parameters is challeng-
ng. In fact, the traditional approach of counting the percentage of
stimated positive and negative alpha–differentials does not test
hether the differences are statistically significant. It implicitly as-
umes π0 
i 





ative approach of counting the percentage of significant positive
nd negative alpha–differentials relies on the estimated standard
rrors and the marginal distribution of t –statistics to account for
he estimation error in a single pairwise test of equal performance.2 In the following, we define the focal fund as the fund of interest, for which the 
eer performance is measured. 
















































































































3 All of the computations performed in this study employed the R statistical com- 
puting language ( R Development Core Team, 2017 ) with the package PeerPerfor- It however does not control for the false positives in the multiple
hypothesis setup of testing the difference between the focal fund’s
alpha against all other peer funds. In practice, because of the small
sample size in fund performance evaluation, there is also a prob-
lem of false negatives due to the lack of power of the t –test. 
The solution that we provide in this paper is designed to ac-
count for these false discoveries. The proposed estimators of the
peer performance parameters, called peer performance ratios , are
obtained in two steps. We first take a frequentist approach to com-
pute, for each of the n peer funds, the p –value of the null hypoth-
esis that the alpha of the peer fund equals the alpha of the fund
considered. False discoveries occur when, in the resulting sample
of p –values, there are small p –values for funds with equal alpha.
As shown by Storey (2002) , Barras et al. (2010) and Bajgrowicz and
Scaillet (2012) , we can then exploit the distribution of p –values un-
der the null hypothesis to obtain a reliable estimate of the peer
performance ratios that is robust to the presence of false discover-
ies in the first–stage sample of p –values. 
Alternatively, one could achieve robustness to false discoveries
using the bootstrap techniques of Kosowski et al. (2005) , Fama and
French (2010) , and Ferson and Chen (2015) , or the parametric ap-
proach of Chen et al. (2017) . The bootstrap requires comparing the
obtained alpha–differential with artificially generated data samples
where the variation in fund performance is due entirely to sam-
ple variability. Under the parametric setup of Chen et al. (2017) ,
peer performance ratios could be obtained by modeling the alpha–
differential as a realization from a mixture of normal distributions.
Both the bootstrap and parametric approaches have the disadvan-
tage of being computationally demanding. In contrast, our non–
parametric approach has an explicit form and is thus simple to
implement. 
We perform an empirical validation of the proposed peer per-
formance ratios on the union of all active and dead hedge funds
in the Hedge Fund Research (HFR) database as of July 2014. The
performance is evaluated based on the funds’ monthly net returns.
The peer category is defined as the group of hedge funds pursu-
ing the same investment style ( e.g. , Macro funds). We account for
the time–variation in the distribution of the hedge funds’ alphas
by calculating the peer performance ratios on monthly net returns
observed over five–year rolling samples for a period ranging from
January 20 0 0 to June 2014. The resulting outperformance ratios are
thus dynamic. We find that, for the majority of hedge funds, there
is a large proportion of funds with equal performance. Therefore,
on average, the standard approach for estimating peer performance
using percentile ranks overestimates the outperformance and un-
derperformance. For our sample of hedge funds, the average dif-
ference between the percentile–rank approach and the proposed
estimator is around 33 percentage points. 
Based on an extensive out–of–sample analysis, we find that ro-
bustness to false positives matters when predicting fund perfor-
mance: The peer performance ratios have predictive value for fu-
ture fund performance, and this predictive value is incremental
to the information contained in alternative performance measures.
Using portfolio sorts, we first show that compared to the tradi-
tional use of the fund’s alpha, the use of the outperformance ratio
to select the top quintile performing funds improves significantly
the performance of the quarterly, semi–annually, and annually re-
balanced portfolios. Second, we combine the various predictors of
fund performance as regressors to forecast the hedge fund (risk–
adjusted excess) return. These predictive regressions indicate that
selecting funds using the outperformance ratio yields a portfolio
with both a higher return and a higher risk–adjusted excess re-
turn. Importantly, this result is robust to adding other performance
measures as predictors, as well as controlling for a host of other
influences. m
o
As an additional test of the validity of the proposed peer per-
ormance ratios, we use a simulation analysis to document their
ood finite sample bias properties. We also confirm standard pre-
ictions about the fund size and fund age on the cross–sectional
istribution of peer performance. In particular, we find that when
 fund has more assets under management, the outperformance
atio tends to be lower and, for two funds with the same age, the
nderperformance ratio is higher. 
Altogether, the empirical results strongly support our view that,
ithin a peer group, there is often an important proportion of
edge funds that have the same alpha. Ignoring this fact leads to
alse discoveries in terms of overestimating both the percentage of
eers that the fund outperforms and that it underperforms. The
roposed peer performance ratios are designed to avoid this prob-
em. Their application to real–world hedge fund return data con-
rms their validity in terms of improved fund selection and es-
imation results that are aligned with model–based predictions. In
ractice, we recommend their use for ex–ante screening of the uni-
erse to select potential investments for a deeper, more fundamen-
al, analysis of the fund’s investment style, portfolio holdings, ex-
enses, and organization, as well as for ex–post performance eval-
ation. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows.
ection 2 introduces the methodology employed to obtain the peer
erformance ratios. Section 3 presents our empirical results re-
arding the importance of avoiding false discoveries in peer per-
ormance analysis for hedge funds. 3 In Section 4 , we give our con-
lusions. 
. Estimation of peer performance ratios 
In this study, we measure the peer performance of a focal fund
 belonging to a peer universe of n + 1 funds using three peer per-
ormance parameters: (i) π0 
i 
: the proportion of funds in the peer
roup that perform equally well as fund i , (ii) π+ 
i 
: the proportion
f funds in the peer group that are outperformed by fund i , and
iii) π−
i 
the proportion of funds in the peer group that outperform
und i . Two major strengths of the proposed peer performance ra-
ios are that they require the relative performance between two
unds to cross a threshold of statistical significance to be counted
s evidence of a difference in performance, and that the false dis-
overy rate methodology is used to obtain peer performance esti-
ates that are robust to false positives. 
.1. Definitions 
We consider a universe with a total of n + 1 funds. We denote
i − j as the (true) difference in performance between fund i and
 ( i  = j ), and ̂ i − j as the corresponding estimate. Throughout this
tudy, we use the hat superscript symbol to denote sample–based
stimates. Our objective is to estimate the percentage of funds that
ave equal, lower, or greater risk–adjusted performance than fund
 . We denote by π0 
i 











number) of funds for which i − j = 0 , i − j > 0 , and i − j < 0 , re-
pectively. 
The risk–adjusted performance of a fund is typically estimated
y the intercept of the least squares regression of the fund returns
n a series of risk factors, such as the four Carhart factors or theance ( Ardia and Boudt, 2017 ), which is freely available at https://CRAN.R-project. 
rg/package=PeerPerformance . 








































































s  even Fung and Hsieh hedge fund risk factors ( Carhart, 1997; Fung
nd Hsieh, 2004 ). 4 Let f t be the ( K × 1) vector of risk factors at
ime t , and denote by r i, t the fund’s i return at time t . A test for
qual performance of two funds i and j is obtained by testing the
ignificance of the estimated intercept of the ordinary least squares
OLS) regression of (r i,t − r j,t ) on f t : 
(r i,t − r j,t ) = i − j + β′ i − j f t + ε i − j,t , (1)
here βi − j is the ( K × 1) vector of factor exposures and ε i − j,t is the
orresponding error term, for t = 1 , . . . , T . The estimated intercept
s: 
̂ 






(r i,t − r j,t ) −̂ β′ i − j f t 
) 
, 
here ̂ βi − j is the least squares estimate of βi − j . From the central
imit theorem, it follows that under regularity conditions, ̂ i − j is
symptotically normally distributed around i − j . In our applica-
ion, we compute its standard error ̂ sei − j using the heteroscedas-
icity and autocorrelation robust (HAC) standard error estimators
f Andrews (1991) and Andrews and Monahan (1992) . 
We denote ̂ τi − j ≡ ̂ i − j / ̂  sei − j as the studentized test statistic
uch that when the absolute value of ̂ τi − j is higher, the evidence
gainst the H 0 of equal performance is greater. The p –values are
hen defined as two times the (estimated) probability integral
ransform of minus the absolute value of ̂ τi − j under H 0 : ̂ p i − j ≡ 2 ̂  F i − j (−| ̂  τi − j | ) , 
here ̂ F i − j is a consistent estimate of the true cumulative distribu-
ion function F i − j of ̂ τi − j under H 0 . In our application, we set ̂ F i − j 
o the standard normal cumulative distribution. 5 
.2. Existing estimators of peer performance 







can be considered. First, let us look at the percentile–
ank estimation approach, which estimates the outperformance ra-
io π+ 
i 
as the percentage of funds for which the estimated perfor-






j  = i 
I{ ̂  i − j ≥ 0 } , (2) 
here I { · } denotes the indicator function, which equals one if the
ondition holds and zero otherwise. Similarly, ̂ −
i 
is given by the
ercentage of funds for which ̂ i − j < 0 . Clearly, the percentile–
ank approach has the disadvantage of implicitly setting the per-
entage of equal performance to zero ( ̂  0 
i 
= 0 , for all i ), and thus
verestimating the percentage of out– and underperformance. 
A second simple but biased estimator of the outperformance
atio π+ 
i 
is the percentage of funds for which the estimated test
tatistic ̂ τi − j exceeds the (estimated) γ + –quantile of the distribu-
ion of ̂ τi − j under the null hypothesis, which is denoted by ̂ q γ + i − j .
ypical values for γ + are 90% and 95%. The corresponding estima-







j  = i 
I{ ̂  τi − j ≥ ̂ q γ + i − j } . (3) 
4 For presentation purposes, we focus on the fund’s alpha as the risk–adjusted 
erformance measure. However, it is straightforward to apply the proposed peer 
erformance evaluation framework with other risk–adjusted performance measures, 
uch as the fund’s (modified) Sharpe ratio, by using the equal–performance test of 
edoit and Wolf (2008) and Ardia and Boudt (2015) . 
5 We considered alternative estimators of F i − j based on (block) bootstrapping the 
mpirical distribution, but the results are qualitatively similar and thus we omit 









i   left–sided threshold ̂ q γ −
i − j is used to compute the underperfor-
ance ratio as the percentage of funds for which ̂ τi − j ≤ ̂ q γ −i − j ,
here γ − is typically 5% or 10%. The percentage of equal perfor-
ance is estimated as the percentage of funds for which the t –
tatistic is between ̂  q 
γ −
i − j and ̂  q 
γ + 







j  = i 
I{ ̂  τi − j > ̂  q γ −i − j } · I{ ̂  τi − j < ̂  q γ
+ 
i − j } . (4)
oth the outperformance ratio estimates obtained using the
ercentile–rank and pairwise significance tests are character-
zed by a potentially large number of false positives ( i.e. , de-
ected instances of outperformance when in fact there is equal–
erformance or underperformance) and false negatives ( i.e. , de-
ected equal– or underperformance when in fact there is outper-
ormance). Formally, we have: 
 
j  = i 
I{ ̂  i − j ≥ 0 } = 
∑ 
j  = i 
i − j > 0 
I{ ̂  i − j ≥ 0 } 




j  = i 
i − j =0 
I{ ̂  i − j ≥ 0 } 
︸ ︷︷ ︸ 





j  = i 
i − j < 0 
I{ ̂  i − j ≥ 0 } 




j  = i 
i − j > 0 
I{ ̂  i − j < 0 } 





j  = i 
I{ ̂  τi − j ≥ ̂ q γ + i − j } = ∑ 
j  = i 
i − j > 0 
I{ ̂  τi − j ≥ ̂ q γ + i − j } 




j  = i 
i − j =0 
I{ ̂  τi − j ≥ ̂ q γ + i − j } 
︸ ︷︷ ︸ 
≈ n 0 
i 
(1 −γ + ) 
+ 
∑ 
j  = i 
i − j < 0 
I{ ̂  τi − j ≥ ̂ q γ + i − j } 




j  = i 
i − j > 0 
I{ ̂  τi − j < ̂  q γ + i − j } 
︸ ︷︷ ︸ 
false negatives 
. (6) 
or the percentile–rank approach in (2) and (5) , we expect that
or most funds, the number of false positives exceeds the num-
er of false negatives, and thus that the estimated outperformance
s overestimated. In case of the significance testing approach in
3) and (6) , the balance depends on the underlying return generat-
ng process and the probability level γ + used for testing. As can be
een in (6) , we have that, for lower values of the critical value ̂  q 
γ + 
i − j ,
here are more false positives, and less false negatives. This ap-
roach accounts for the estimation error in the setting of pairwise
esting, but not the joint hypothesis of testing equal–performance
ith the peer funds. 
We thus need an estimator for the outperformance ratio that is
obust to false positives under a framework of multiple hypothe-
is testing. As a solution, it might be tempting to use a sequence
f multiple hypothesis tests, such as Hotelling’s T2 test of equal-
ty of Sharpe ratios, with family–wise error rate control of Type I









































































t  errors over the sequence of tests. 6 The disadvantage of those mul-
tiple tests is that their applicability to our problem is reduced
when the number of peer funds is large. The standard setup re-
quires that the time series is available for the same period for all
funds, which limits the number of observations to the time span
of the fund with the shortest history. 
2.3. Proposed estimation strategy 
The estimator we propose combines the advantages of pairwise
and multiple testing in a two–step estimation procedure. For each
fund, we first estimate the percentage of peer funds with equal
performance in an unbiased manner using only pairwise tests of
equal performance between the focal fund and a peer fund. Af-
ter performing this procedure for each potential pair, a sample
of p –values ̂ p i − j associated with a two–sided test of the null hy-
pothesis H 0 : i − j = 0 , for j = 1 , . . . , n, j  = i , is obtained. For fixed
i , the distribution of the p –values is (asymptotically) a mixture of
p –values that are uniformly distributed (the pairs for which the
null hypothesis is correct) and p –values that are close to zero
(when the null hypothesis is false). This key insight is provided by
Storey (2002) and it is used by Barras et al. (2010) to estimate the
proportion of funds that perform equally well in the same manner
as a passive investor in style indices. 7 
The next step is then to attribute the remaining segment of the
peer group to funds that significantly underperform and those that
outperform. Thus, for each fund, we obtain an equal–performance
ratio , an outperformance ratio , and an underperformance ratio . The
proposed equal–performance ratio is robust to false discoveries,
and unless the fund performance differs significantly from its
peers, it will tend toward 100%. When the return data are suffi-
ciently informative about differences in performance, the outper-
formance ratio is suitable for classifying funds into top–performing
funds. The estimators rely on pairwise tests to calculate the p –
values, thus they can use the longest common time series span
for each pair in an optimal manner, and parallel computing can
be employed to calculate these p –values in a numerically efficient
way. 
2.4. The equal–performance ratio 
A crucial feature of the proposed peer performance ratios is
that they exploit the difference in the distribution of the p –valueŝ p i − j when i − j = 0 versus i − j  = 0 . 
If the test is sufficiently powerful, a threshold value λi ex-
ists such that almost surely the p –value of the two–sided equal–
performance test is less than λi if the two funds have different
performances: 
(A 1) : P [ ̂  p i − j < λi | i − j  = 0] = 1 . (7)
The validity of this assumption depends on the magnitude of i − j ,
the test statistic itself, the calculation of its p –value ( e.g. , asymp-
totic versus bootstrap methods), and the sample size. 6 This sequential testing approach involves first testing the null hypothesis of 
equal performance of the focal fund and the n peer funds. If the hypothesis is re- 
jected, an elimination rule ( e.g. , removing the fund that contributes most to the test 
statistic) is then used subsequently to test for equal performance with the n − 1 re- 
maining peer funds. This procedure is then repeated until the null hypothesis is 
no longer rejected. This test is similar to the reality check test of White (20 0 0) , 
the superior predictive ability test of Hansen (2005) , and the model confidence set 
of Hansen et al. (2011) . 
7 Instead of estimating the market–wide equal–performance ratio, as in 
Barras et al. (2010) , we estimate the individual equal–performance ratio for each 
fund, which broadens the application scope. The aggregate equal–performance ratio 
allows us to answer general economic questions such as the usefulness of actively 
managed funds, but our proposed individual equal–performance ratio can be used 












In the case of equal performance, and provided that the esti-
ated ̂ F i − j coincides with the true F i − j used to calculate the p –
alue, the p –value is uniformly distributed for a given pair ( i, j ).
his implies that the probability of ̂ p i − j exceeding λi when i − j =
 is 1 − λi : 
(A 2) : P [ ̂  p i − j ≥ λi | i − j = 0] = 1 − λi . (8)
n practice, the cumulative distribution function F i − j is not fully
nown and the calculation of the p –values requires parameter esti-
ates. Asymptotically, the p –value is uniformly distributed if con-
istent estimators are used ( Rosenblatt, 1952 ), whereas in finite
amples, assumption ( A 2) is only approximately satisfied. 
A key result related to the definition of the proposed equal–
erformance ratio is that under ( A 1) and ( A 2), the expected num-
er of p –values exceeding λi is (1 − λi ) n 0 i , with n 0 i the number of
eer funds that perform equally well as the focal fund: 
 
[ ∑ 
j  = i 
I{ ̂  p i − j ≥ λi } 
] 
= E 
⎡ ⎢ ⎣ ∑ 
j  = i 
i − j =0 
I{ ̂  p i − j ≥ λi } 
⎤ ⎥ ⎦ 
︸ ︷︷ ︸ 
= (1 −λi ) n 0 i 
+ E 
⎡ ⎢ ⎣ ∑ 
j  = i 
i − j  =0 
I{ ̂  p i − j ≥ λi } 
⎤ ⎥ ⎦ 
︸ ︷︷ ︸ 
= 0 
= (1 − λi ) n 0 i . 
ence, a natural estimator for n 0 
i 
is the number of estimated p –




i ≡ c 0 i min 
{∑ 
j  = i I{ ̂  p i − j ≥ λi } 




here we include an additional adjustment to bound from above
he extrapolation to the number of peer funds, and c 0 
i 
is a cor-
ection factor that adjusts for the bias induced by the truncation;
ee Appendix A . The corresponding estimate for the proportion of
qual performance is: 
̂ 0 
i ≡




ince the estimator ̂ π0 
i 
has the form of a sample average, we ex-
ect that in most relevant cases, the estimator ̂ π0 
i 
is not only un-
iased but also consistent for π0 
i 
. The proof of this requires a suit-
ble law of large numbers that allows for the dependence in the
 –values. 8 
The practical computation of the equal–performance ratio thus
equires us to choose the threshold value λi . The larger the value
f λi , the more likely it is that assumptions (A1) and (A2) are
atisfied, but the fewer observations enter the summation used
o estimate the equal–performance ratio in (9) –(10) . We address
his bias–variance trade–off in the estimation of π0 
i 
by optimiz-
ng the choice of λi based on a data–driven approach to deter-
ine the value of λi ∈ { 0 . 3 , 0 . 32 , . . . , 0 . 7 } which minimizes the es-
imated mean squared estimation error of ̂ π0 
i 
. See Appendix B for
ore details. In our application to hedge funds, λ varies betweeni 
8 Each p –value is uniformly distributed under the null hypothesis, but because 
of the correlation across hedge funds and the comparison with a common peer, 
he p –values corresponding to the different i − j = 0 tests are not uniformly dis- 
ributed for different i and j . In the case of excessively high dependence, this may 
ake the estimator inconsistent ( e.g. , when all p –values are identical). This strong 
ependence can occur in the rare case where a fund outperforms its peers by large 
mounts, where the data are not sufficiently informative to distinguish between a 
ero–alpha fund and a talented fund. See Bajgrowicz and Scaillet (2012 , Appendix 
) and the references therein. 

























































































e  .3 and 0.7 with a median (resp. mean) value of 0.64 (0.56). In
ost cases, the concern of avoiding bias thus dominates the objec-
ive of precision in estimating the equal–performance ratios. 
.5. The out– and underperformance ratios 
Given the estimate of the number of peer funds with equal per-
ormance ̂ n0 
i 
, and the observed performance differences ̂ i − j , we
hen estimate the number of funds that are outperformed by the
ocal fund i , n + 
i 
, and those that outperform fund i , n −
i 
. The attribu-
ion is based on the number of significant performance differences
using the studentized test statistic ̂ τi − j ≡ ̂ i − j / ̂  sei − j ) and an ad-
ustment for false discoveries. 
Clearly, given an estimate of n + 
i 
, we obtain an estimate for n −
i 




= n − n 0 
i 
, and vice versa. We start
he estimation procedure on the side for which we have most ob-
ervations. If there are more point estimates of outperformance by
und i ( i.e. , when 
∑ 
j  = i I{ ̂  i − j ≥ 0 } ≥ n/ 2 ), we first estimate n + i , and






. The estimate ̂ n+ 
i 
is based on the
act that n + 
i 
corresponds to the naive estimate of the number of
eer funds that are significantly outperformed by the focal fund
at a one–sided confidence level γ + , that is, the number of funds
or which the estimated test statistic ̂ τi − j exceeds the (estimated)
+ –quantile of the distribution of ̂ τi − j under the null hypothesis,
hich is denoted by ̂ q γ + 
i − j ), 
9 adjusted for the false positives ( i.e. ,
ases where ̂ τi − j ≥ ̂ q γ + i − j when i − j ≤ 0 ) and false negatives ( i.e. ,






j  = i 
I{ i − j > 0 } 
= 
∑ 
j  = i 
I{ ̂  τi − j ≥ ̂ q γ + i − j } − ∑ 
j  = i 
i − j =0 
I{ ̂  τi − j ≥ ̂ q γ + i − j } 
︸ ︷︷ ︸ 
≈ n 0 
i 
(1 −γ + ) 
−
∑ 
j  = i 
i − j < 0 
I{ ̂  τi − j ≥ ̂ q γ + i − j } 




j  = i 
i − j > 0 
I{ ̂  τi − j < ̂  q γ + i − j } 




j  = i 
I{ ̂  τi − j ≥ ̂ q γ + i − j } − n 0 i (1 − γ + ) . (11) 
The approximation error in the last step of (11) is small for
ell–chosen values of γ + . First, given ̂ n0 
i 
, we can infer that the
umber of false positives is ̂ n0 
i 
(1 − γ + ) if i − j = 0 . As ̂ n0 i is an
nbiased estimate of n 0 
i 
, so is ̂ n0 
i 
(1 − γ + ) an unbiased estimate
or the false discoveries when i − j = 0 . Since there are relatively
ore cases where ̂ i − j is positive rather than negative, the data
ndicate that the fund is more likely to be outperforming than un-
erperforming. Therefore, the number of false positives is negligi-
le when i − j < 0 and false negatives are avoided by setting γ + 
s sufficiently low. 10 9 In our application, we use the asymptotic Normal distribution of ̂  τi − j and thus 
e set ̂  q 
γ + 
i − j as the γ
+ –quantile of the standard Normal distribution. 
10 For the estimation of the number of good and bad managers, 
arras et al. (2010) follow the same reasoning. Ferson and Chen (2015) note 
hat, when for many peer funds j , the difference in performance i − j is not zero 
ut small, there is a tendency to overestimate the equal–performance ratio. We 
o not worry much about the overestimation of π 0 
i 
when i − j = 0 , because, 
conomically speaking, the overestimation of π0 
i 
and the likely underestimation 




is acceptable, as it reflects the simple fact that the data 










In the opposite case where there are more point estimates of
nderperformance by fund i ( i.e. , when 
∑ 
j  = i I{ ̂  i − j ≥ 0 } < n/ 2 ), al-
ost all of the peer funds either perform equally well or outper-
orm fund i , such that n −
i 
is accurately estimated by 
∑ 




i − j } −̂ n0 i γ −, provided that we set γ − as sufficiently high so that
he number of false negatives becomes negligible. In the applica-
ion, we set γ + = 0 . 4 to avoid the false negatives and γ − = 0 . 6 to
void the false positives. 
Thus, by including an additional adjustment to the extrapola-
ion, we obtain the following natural definitions of the outperfor-









j  = i 




j  = i 
I{ ̂  i − j ≥ 0 } ≥ n/ 2 














j  = i 




j  = i 
I{ ̂  i − j ≥ 0 } < n/ 2 
1 − ̂ π0 
i 
− ̂ π+ 
i 
otherwise . 
t is important to note that, compared to the approach of count-
ng the significant alpha–differential estimates in (3) , the outper-
ormance and underperformance ratios explicitly correct for the
resence of false positives by subtracting the terms ̂  n0 
i 




γ −, respectively. 
.6. Illustration on simulated return data 
We now perform a Monte Carlo study to compare the finite
ample bias of the proposed peer performance ratios with the al-
ernative, more simple percentile–rank and significance test–based
stimates discussed in Section 2.1 . We present the results for esti-
ating the outperformance ( π+ ) and equal–performance ( π0 ) pa-
ameters. The significance test–based estimates in (3) and (4) are
mplemented using either γ + = 90% and γ − = 10% , or γ + = 95%
nd γ − = 5% . We refer to the former using ̂  τ+ 
0 . 10 
and ̂  τ 0 




0 . 05 
and ̂ τ 0 
0 . 05 
for the latter. 
The Monte Carlo setup is as follows. We assume a population of
 = 250 peer funds for which fund returns have the same volatil-
ty, but 10% (25 funds), 80% (200 funds) and 10% (25 funds) of all
unds have an average annual return of 5%, 15% and 25%, respec-
ively. For each replication, we draw T = 60 monthly returns either
rom a multivariate Normal distribution or via a Normal copula–
arginal approach with skewed Student- t marginal distributions
ith fat tails and negative skewness. 11 The pairwise correlation is
et to 50% in both cases. To evaluate the effect of overlap in the re-
urn distribution on the bias of the estimators, we consider three
cenarios for the volatility σ . In the “Low” volatility scenario, we
et the annual standard deviation to 5%. In the “Medium” volatil-
ty scenario, we set it to 7.5%. Finally, in the “High” volatility sce-
ario, we set it to 10%. We perform 10 0 0 replications and mea-
ure the bias of the equal– and outperformance ratios, computed
s the average (over the Monte Carlo replications) of the differ-
nces between the estimator of equal– or outperformance ratio,
nd the true equal– or outperformance ratio. The true value ofnderperformance. Moreover, in contrast with Barras et al. (2010) and Ferson and 
hen (2015) , the outcome of our analysis is not a statistic describing the whole 
niverse, but a triplet of peer performance measures for each hedge fund, for 
hich the ordinal interpretation is robust to potential tendencies to overestimate 
he equal–performance ratio in case the data is not sufficiently informative. 
11 We take the setup of Ardia and Boudt (2015) and rely on the standardized 
kewed Student–t marginal distributions with degrees of freedom parameter ν = 6 
nd asymmetry parameter ξ = 0 . 75 , which were calibrated on a universe of hedge 
und returns similar to the one used in our empirical study. 
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Table 1 
Monte Carlo results – Bias estimation. 
This table presents the Monte Carlo results of the finite sample bias of the various estimators of the equal– and outperformance ratio 
parameters when the universe consists of n = 250 peer funds. All funds have returns from the same distribution, except that 10% (25 
funds), 80% (200 funds) and 10% (25 funds) of all funds have an average annual return of 5%, 15% and 25%, respectively. We perform 10 0 0 
replications for which we draw T = 60 monthly returns from a multivariate Normal distribution (Panel A) or via a Normal copula–marginal 
approach (Panel B) with skewed Student- t marginal distributions with fat tails and negative skewness. The pairwise correlation is set to 
50% in both cases. We visualize the impact of overlapping distributions on the finite sample bias by considering a low ( σ = 5% ), medium 
( σ = 7 . 5% ) and high volatility ( σ = 10% ) scenario. The peer–performance estimators considered are the peer–performance ratios: ̂ π0 and ̂ π+ , the percentile–rank estimators: ̂ 0 and ̂ + , and significance test–based estimates at the 10% and 5% levels: ̂  τ 0 0 . 10 , ̂  τ+ 0 . 10 , ̂  τ 0 0 . 05 and ̂  τ+ 0 . 05 . 
See Section 2.6 for details. 
Equal–performance Outperformance 
̂ π0 ̂ 0 ̂ τ 0 0 . 10 ̂ τ 0 0 . 05 ̂ π+ ̂ + ̂ τ+ 0 . 10 ̂ τ+ 0 . 05 
Panel A: Multivariate Normal with pairwise correlations of 50% 
σ = 5% −0.014 −0.660 −0.070 −0.035 0.007 0.330 0.035 0.017 
σ = 7 . 5% −0.008 −0.660 −0.041 0.013 0.004 0.330 0.020 −0.006 
σ = 10% 0.021 −0.660 0.018 0.088 −0.010 0.330 −0.009 −0.044 
Panel B: Copula–Skewed Student–t marginals with pairwise correlations of 50% 
σ = 5% −0.017 −0.660 −0.069 −0.033 0.010 0.330 0.034 0.017 
σ = 7 . 5% −0.009 −0.660 −0.038 0.016 0.006 0.330 0.019 −0.008 











































































12 The choice of a five–year window length is motivated by the requirement to 
ensure a sufficient sample size to estimate the peer performance ratios with ac- 
ceptable accuracy, while allowing the estimated peer performance ratios to be re- 
sponsive to changes in the underlying hedge fund’s performance. equal–performance ratio within the groups is 10%, 80% and 10%,
respectively. The true value of outperformance ratio within the
groups is 0%, 10% and 90%, respectively. 
First, let us consider in Table 1 the bias of the percentile–rank
approach to estimating the equal–performance parameter. Sincê 0 = 0 , we have that its bias in all scenarios equals 0 . 1 × (0 −
0 . 1) + 0 . 8 × (0 − 0 . 8) + 0 . 1 × (0 − 0 . 1) = −0 . 66 . Because of the un-
derestimation of π0 , the outperformance and underperformance
ratio are overestimated, resulting in a bias of 0.33 for ̂ + in all
scenarios considered. More interesting is the finite sample bias
of the proposed equal–performance ratio ̂ π0 versus the estima-
tor based on computing the percentage of pairwise differences in
performance at the 10% and 5% level, which are denoted by ̂ τ 0 
0 . 10 
and ̂ τ 0 
0 . 05 
. Parameter ̂ π0 has a finite sample bias because of the
small sample size used for testing ( T = 60 , n = 250 ), while ̂ τ 0 
0 . 10
and ̂ τ 0 
0 . 05 
are intrinsically biased because of the false positives that
arise in pairwise testing (as shown in (6) ). For all three estima-
tors, the finite sample bias increases (in absolute value) when the
return distributions of the three types of funds have a higher over-
lap, that is, when σ is higher, and it thus becomes more difficult
to distinguish equal–performance from outperformance and under-
performance using a finite sample. 
In our setup, the finite sample bias of ̂ π0 is negligible. The fi-
nite sample bias of ̂ τ 0 
0 . 10 
tends be negative when there is little
overlap, because of the large number of false positives when test-
ing at the 10% level. There are fewer false positives when testing
at the 5% level, at the expense of a higher number of false neg-
atives. Indeed, the large positive bias of ̂ τ 0 
0 . 05 
is due to the fact
that, at a low significance level and thus a high cutoff value, many
estimated differences in performance are not detected as signif-
icant. They thus inflate the estimation of the equal–performance
ratio. In contrast, the proposed peer performance ratio uses a cut-
off λi ∈ { 0 . 3 , 0 . 32 , . . . , 0 . 7 } and is therefore by design more robust
to false negatives than when statistical significance tests are used
at the 10% or 5% one–sided significance levels. Finally, note in the
right part of Table 1 , that the finite sample bias of the estimator of
π+ is around minus one half of the bias of the corresponding esti-
mator of π0 . The good finite sample bias properties of the equal–
performance ratio ̂ π0 thus also lead to good finite sample proper-
ties of ̂ π+ (and ̂ π−, since ̂ π0 + ̂  π+ + ̂  π− = 1 ). 
3. Application to hedge funds 
We now illustrate the practical relevance of the proposed peer
performance ratios to analyze the performance of hedge funds. Werst introduce the empirical setup regarding data used and choices
n implementation. We then quantify the overestimation of outper-
ormance and underperformance when the traditional percentile
ank–based outperformance is used. Next, we use a portfolio sort-
ng analysis to assess the out–of–sample gains in performance that
an be achieved by selecting funds on their outperformance ratio
ather than on their estimated alpha. Finally, we verify that the
ross–section of peer performance is consistent with theoretical
redictions about the determinants of peer performance. 
.1. Data description 
Our universe consists of the active and dead U.S. hedge funds
ncluded in the Hedge Fund Research (HFR) database as of July
014. To account for the time–variation in the distribution of the
edge funds’ alpha, we use rolling five–year estimation windows
f monthly hedge fund net returns and factor data over the pe-
iod 20 0 0–2014. 12 This thus leads to 39 estimation dates and a
otal of 15,370 funds. To avoid survivorship bias, the fund com-
osition of each sample changes, and tracks the funds available
n the HFR alive and dead funds databases for the correspond-
ng period. On each of the (rolling) quarterly database updates, we
xclude funds with less than 60 available observations, and keep
.S. funds pursuing either an Equity Hedge, Event–Driven, Relative
alue or Macro investment style. We further delete incoherent and
uplicate entries following the approach described in Joenväärä
t al. (2016) . To diminish the risk of backfill bias, we remove the
rst 12–month history of each hedge fund in our database, such
hat the effective number of observations per estimation window
anges between 48 and 60. On average, there are 1391 funds per
rolling) quarterly sample, with a minimum of 921 funds and a
aximum of 1634 funds. Each sample starts at the beginning of
he quarter and is indexed by q = 1 , . . . , 39 ( i.e. , January 20 0 0–
ecember 2004, April 2000–March 2005,..., July 2009–June 2014). 
We define the peer group as the set of hedge funds follow-
ng the same investment style (Equity Hedge, Event–Driven, Macro,
nd Relative Value). As the pairwise peer performance measure,
e use the alpha–differential obtained as the intercept in the lin-
ar factor model in (1) , estimated using the nine risk factors con-
tituting the union of the four factors in Carhart (1997) and the
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Table 2 
Summary statistics. 
This table presents the average value of the number of funds, the fund performance, and the fund characteristics over the quarterly updated 
five–year estimation samples between January 20 0 0 and June 2014 (average over 39 samples). Panel A reports the summary statistics for 
the annualized performance (geometric return in percent) of each fund, averaged across all funds, the Equity Hedge, Event–Driven, Macro, 
and Relative Value hedge funds. N (rounded) is the number of funds, Mean is the average, Med is the median, Std is the standard deviation, 
Min/Max are the minimum and maximum values, and 25th/75th are the 25th and 75th percentiles. Panel B reports the funds’ monthly 
nine–factor model alpha values (in percent, annualized). Panel C reports the distribution of the average value of the fund characteristics (as 
observed at the beginning of each sample). AUM is the asset under management expressed in million US dollars. Age is the fund’s age in 
months since the fund’s inception date. Management and performance fees are in percent. Leverage, hurdle rate, and high watermark are 
dummy variables. Note that because of the averaging per group, the average maximum value of all funds is not equal to the maximum of 
the average values per fund style. See Section 3.1 for details. 
N Mean Med Std Min 25th 75th Max 
Panel A: Fund compound returns (in percent, annualized) 
All Funds 1391 8.49 7.56 9.28 −35.25 3.58 12.27 75.98 
Equity Hedge 715 8.51 7.50 9.67 −32.90 3.46 12.46 71.03 
Event–Driven 163 8.61 7.79 7.82 −16.86 4.34 11.82 48.44 
Macro 290 8.10 7.01 8.41 −19.36 3.22 11.56 58.34 
Relative Value 224 8.64 7.90 8.71 −25.89 4.58 11.91 57.46 
Panel B: Fund monthly alpha (in percent, annualized) 
All Funds 3.91 3.24 8.68 −41.52 −0.54 7.73 66.93 
Equity Hedge 2.90 2.37 8.56 −39.19 −1.47 6.79 57.17 
Event–Driven 3.81 3.37 6.86 −19.38 0 .26 6.96 36.40 
Macro 5.56 4.60 9.49 −25.89 0.20 9.74 62.13 
Relative Value 4.92 4.26 7.93 −27.88 1.18 8.27 46.42 
Panel C: Fund characteristics 
AUM (mn USD) 201.43 45.91 539.70 0.02 12.17 160.18 8952.06 
Age (months) 62.43 47.54 54.55 1.00 20.99 89.41 541.56 
Management fee (%) 1.44 1.48 0.56 0.00 1.00 2.00 6.00 
Performance fee (%) 18.54 20.00 5.35 0.00 20.00 20.00 47.05 
Leverage (yes/no) 0.63 1.00 
Hurdle rate (yes/no) 0.13 0.00 




























































s  even factors in Fung and Hsieh (2004) . 13 The p –values are com-
uted using heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard
rror estimators ( Andrews, 1991; Andrews and Monahan, 1992 ). In
he remainder, we denote the resulting peer performance ratio es-




and ̂ π0 
i,q 
. Because
he universe changes, the longitudinal time series of peer perfor-
ance ratio estimates is unbalanced. 
In Table 2 we present the summary statistics describing the
niverse composition and the funds’ individual performance as av-
rages over the 39 samples used to compute the peer performance
atios. Column 2 of Panel A reports the distribution of hedge funds
cross the different investment styles. Half of the funds classify
heir investments as Equity Hedge (51%). The remaining funds be-
ong to the categories Macro (21%), Relative Value (16%) and Event–
riven (12%). Columns 3–9 of Panel A report the averages of lo-
ation, scale, and shape statistics for the annualized net perfor-
ance of the hedge funds in the sample. We find that, over all
unds included in the universe and over all 39 samples, the av-
rage annual return is around 8.5% per year. The other statistics
ndicate a large cross–sectional variation in the average returns, as
an be seen from the large values for the cross–sectional standard
eviation (around 7.5%) and the range of annualized returns. The
istribution tends to be positively skewed with an average mini-
um performance of −35.25% and an average top performance of
5.98%. The differences in average net performance across invest-
ent styles are small. However, the cross–sectional heterogene-
ty in performance is higher for the Equity Hedge funds (average
ross–sectional standard deviation of 9.67% and average range of
03.93%) than for the Event–Driven hedge funds (average standard
eviation of 7.82% and average range of 65.3%). 13 The data are retrieved from the data library of Kenneth French ( http://mba.tuck. 
artmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data _ library.html ) and David Hsieh ( http:// 





p  The distribution of net returns needs to be adjusted for the risk
actor exposure before testing for equal performance. Panel B re-
orts the distribution of the average (annualized) monthly alpha
f the hedge funds obtained by OLS estimation of the linear model
egressing the net returns in excess of the risk–free rate against
he nine Carhart (1997) –Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors. We can
ee that adjusting for the risk factor exposure creates more het-
rogeneity in the average performance of the hedge funds belong-
ng to the different investment styles. On average, the Macro hedge
unds have the highest (annualized) alpha (5.56%), followed by the
elative Value funds (4.92%), and Event–Driven funds (3.81%). The
orst performance regarding average alpha is by the Equity Hedge
nvestment funds (2.90%). These differences in performance across
nvestment styles support our choice of following investment prac-
ice by considering funds with the same style as the peer group. 
The summary statistics for the size (in million US dollars), age
in months since the fund’s inception date), leverage, and fee struc-
ure of the hedge funds in our database used for the regression
nalysis of the determinants of peer performance are presented in
anel C. We can see that the median fund in our universe is four
ears old at the beginning of the sample, has 45 million USD assets
nder management (AUM), charges a management fee of 1.48%,
nd has a performance fee of 20%. The median fund has a high
atermark and uses leverage, but does not apply a hurdle rate. 
.2. Cross–section of peer performance 
Let us now study the distribution of peer performance across
edge funds and how it relates to the individual performance mea-
ure of the fund. In Fig. 1 , we present a two–panel plot, which in
he left part displays the average (annualized) monthly alpha of
he different funds sorted in descending order and grouped into 50
qual–sized buckets, where “Bucket1” corresponds to the best per-
orming funds in terms of alpha. In the right part, a barplot dis-
lays the average estimated out–, equal–, and underperformance
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Fig. 1. Screening plot. 
This figure presents the concept of screening plot. The left plot displays the average (annualized) monthly alpha for hedge funds ranked by decreasing alpha and grouped in 
50 buckets. The right plot displays, for each of the 50 buckets, the average of the outperformance (black), equal–performance (light gray), and underperformance (dark gray) 
ratios of the hedge funds belonging to that bucket based on sorting on alpha. The diagonal dashed lines are displayed to help visualize the asymmetry in the distribution of 














































ratios in black, light gray, and dark gray, respectively. The buckets
in the right plot correspond to the same 50 buckets of the left plot.
We can see that, although the alpha and the outperformance
ratio are strongly positively dependent, the relationship is highly
nonlinear. We find for instance that a decrease of the fund’s alpha
by ten percentage points has a substantially larger impact on the
outperformance ratio for a top alpha performing fund than for a
middle alpha performing fund. For the middle performing funds,
the equal–performance ratio is above 80%, thereby indicating that
they only out– or underperform a minority of their peer funds. 
To screen hedge funds (as in real–life hedge fund selection), it
is more usual to present the peer performance statistics in tabu-
lar form. Thus, we provide this presentation in Table 3 for funds
available as of June 2014, where the performance measures are
computed from July 2009 to June 2014. The funds are sorted
in descending order of their alpha values. Column 1 reports the
(anonymized) name of the fund. Column 2 reports the investment
style. Columns 3–6 report the percentiles and the out– and under-
performance ratios for the fund mentioned in the row compared to
other funds with the given investment style indicated in the col-
umn header. 
We notice that there is substantial scope for out– or under-
performance within an investment style. For instance, four of the
five underperforming funds are Equity Hedge, but the second and
fifth best–performing funds also employ the Equity Hedge style.
Similarly, one Macro fund is among the top–five performing hedge
funds and one Macro fund is in the bottom–five performing funds..3. Overestimation of out– and underperformance in traditional 
ank–based peer performance evaluation 
The traditional approach to estimating the percentage of out–
nd underperformance is to take the percentile–rank of the fund’s
stimated individual performance, and to conclude that a fund
ith rank k outperforms n − k + 1 out of n peers. This approach
gnores the fact that there is also a large proportion of equal–
erformance between investment funds. The proposed peer per-
ormance ratios remediate this through the false discovery rate ap-
roach by explicitly taking into account the possibility of observing
ifferent estimates of the fund’s individual performance, while the
rue performance is identical. We can thus interpret the difference
etween the traditional rank–based estimate of the fund’s outper-
ormance and ̂ π+ 
i 
as a proxy for the degree of overestimation in




≡ outperformance based on ranks ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 
≡ ( n −k +1 n ) 





imilarly, the overestimation of underperformance in the corre-




≡ underperformance based on ranks ︸ ︷︷ ︸ 
≡ ( k −1 n ) 
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Table 3 
Fund rankings and peer performance. 
This table presents the fund rankings and peer performance in various peer universes for the hedge funds sample as of June 2014. It 
reports the five best, five most central, and five worst funds (in terms of fund’s alpha), as well as the ranking and the outperformance 
and underperformance ratios with respect to a given universe: Equity Hedge (619 funds), Event–Driven (135 funds), Macro (254 funds) and 
Relative Value (201 funds). The first number is the rank of the fund within the peer universe. The square parentheses show the out– and 
underperformance ratios for the peer universe. The sample comprises 1,209 funds, where the performance measures are computed based 
on monthly figures for a five–year period ranging from July 2009 to June 2014. See Section 3.2 for details. 
Fund Strategy Equity Hedge Event–Driven Macro Relative Value 
A Relative Value 1 [0.99;0.00] 1 [1.0 0;0.0 0] 1 [1.0 0;0.0 0] 1 [1.0 0;0.0 0] 
B Equity Hedge 1 [0.98;0.00] 1 [1.0 0;0.0 0] 1 [0.97;0.00] 2 [0.94;0.00] 
C Macro 2 [0.97;0.00] 1 [1.0 0;0.0 0] 1 [0.97;0.00] 2 [0.93;0.00] 
D Relative Value 2 [0.98;0.00] 1 [1.0 0;0.0 0] 2 [0.97;0.00] 2 [0.95;0.00] 
E Equity Hedge 2 [0.86;0.00] 1 [0.70;0.00] 2 [0.69;0.00] 3 [0.35;0.00] 
     
K Equity Hedge 234 [0.0 0;0.0 0] 94 [0.0 0;0.0 0] 115 [0.0 0;0.0 0] 158 [0.0 0;0.0 0] 
L Equity Hedge 235 [0.21;0.00] 94 [0.00;0.26] 115 [0.17;0.05] 158 [0.00;0.38] 
M Equity Hedge 236 [0.25;0.04] 94 [0.00;0.26] 115 [0.22;0.08] 158 [0.00;0.37] 
N Equity Hedge 237 [0.0 0;0.0 0] 94 [0.0 0;0.0 0] 115 [0.0 0;0.0 0] 158 [0.00;0.08] 
O Event–Driven 238 [0.30;0.06] 94 [0.07;0.46] 115 [0.24;0.13] 158 [0.00;0.53] 
     
V Macro 616 [0.00;0.98] 136 [0.0 0;1.0 0] 254 [0.00;0.99] 202 [0.0 0;1.0 0] 
W Equity Hedge 616 [0.00;0.99] 136 [0.0 0;1.0 0] 255 [0.00;0.98] 202 [0.0 0;1.0 0] 
X Equity Hedge 617 [0.00;0.99] 136 [0.0 0;1.0 0] 255 [0.00;0.99] 202 [0.0 0;1.0 0] 
Y Equity Hedge 618 [0.00;0.99] 136 [0.0 0;1.0 0] 255 [0.0 0;1.0 0] 202 [0.0 0;1.0 0] 








































































f  oth terms can take values in the range of -100% to 100%. In prac-
ice, we expect that the percentile–rank approach overestimates




and ̂  δ−
i 
are positive. 
The left plot in Fig. 2 presents the average (over the 39 quar-
erly windows) estimate of the degree of overestimation in the
utperformance for the 50 buckets of hedge funds in our universe,






are positive. On average, ̂ δ+ 
i 
equals 32.28%, which in-
icates that, compared to the proposed outperformance ratio, the
ercentile–rank based approach overestimates outperformance by
n average of 32.28 percentage points. Similarly, in the right plot,
e can see that, compared to the underperformance ratio, the
ercentile–rank approach significantly overestimates underperfor- 
ance by an average of 33.20 percentage points. 
.4. Gains in out–of–sample portfolio performance when sorting on ̂ + and ̂ π− versus ̂ α
Using portfolio sorts, we now analyze whether the investor
enefits from selecting top quintile funds using the outperfor-
ance and underperformance ratios in comparison to using the
und’s estimated alpha. 14 We use the top quintile portfolio in
erms of the outperformance ratio to construct a portfolio of
op–performing funds, and the top quintile portfolio in terms of
he underperformance ratio to construct a portfolio of bottom–
erforming funds. We still use monthly returns for the estimation
f the peer performance parameters but set the investment hori-
on to one quarter, six months and one year. The out–of–sample
valuation ranges from 2005–Q1 to 2014–Q2 and has thus 38 quar-
ers. The six–month (resp. one–year) horizon portfolios are imple-
ented as portfolios that at each quarter–end are equally invested
n the current and (resp. three) previous quarter–end portfolios. 
To summarize the investment value, we report in Table 4 , four
easures of out–of–sample portfolio performance (annualized av-
rage return, volatility, Sharpe ratio and alpha of the nine–factor
odel). Within the quintile portfolios, the funds are either equal–14 As a robustness check, we verified that the same conclusions were obtained 




eighted or value–weighted. 15 Panel A reports the result obtained
hen sorting using the outperformance and underperformance ra-
io. The performance results obtained using the alpha measures
re shown in Panels B–D. In Panel B, the funds included in the
op (resp. bottom) quintile portfolios are those with the highest
resp. lowest) estimated alpha. In Panel C we restrict this by the
dditional condition that the funds can only belong to the top and
ottom quintile alpha portfolios if the corresponding t –statistic is
arger than two in absolute values. In Panel D, the funds are sorted
sing the t –statistic of the estimated alpha. 
First, note that for all sorting criteria used, the difference in
ut–of–sample performance between the top and bottom perfor-
ance portfolios is as expected. In all cases, the top quintile port-
olio has a higher annualized return, lower standard deviation,
igher Sharpe ratio and a higher alpha than the corresponding bot-
om quintile portfolio. 
Second, it is of interest to note that the risk of the top quintile
ortfolio is substantially reduced when selecting funds based on
he alpha t –statistic rather than the fund’s alpha. We find that se-
ecting funds using the alpha t –statistic leads to trade–off in terms
f a lower annualized return and volatility, compared to select-
ng using the fund’s alpha. In fact, for both the equal–weighting
nd value–weighting schemes and all three investment horizons,
he top quintile portfolio using the alpha t –statistic has the low-
st standard deviation. In contrast, the top quintile portfolio using
he outperformance ratio always has the highest annualized return
nd alpha. This is thus prima facie evidence of the economic value
f controlling for false discoveries when separating the good from
he bad funds in a universe of peer funds. 
As a robustness test, we present in Panel E of Table 4 , the
esults obtained when the peer group is enlarged to all funds
n the universe, instead of restricting it to the funds belonging
o the same investment style. Statistically, this can improve the
ccuracy of the estimation, but economically, it creates a possi-
le “apples and oranges” problem since we mix funds with dif-
erent investment styles in the peer analysis. Comparing Panel A15 In case of value–weighting, the lagged value of the fund’s assets under manage- 
ent is used. The advantage of considering value–weighting compared with equal–
eighting is that the performance is not driven by small hedge funds that may not 
e investable. 
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Fig. 2. The degree of overestimation in rank–based estimation of outperformance and underperformance. 
The outperformance (underperformance) ratio is a robust alternative to the common practice of measuring outperformance (underperformance) as the percentage of peer 
funds for which the fund’s performance is lower (higher) than the fund of interest. We interpret the difference between the rank–based outperformance (underperformance) 
and the outperformance (underperformance) ratio as an estimate for the degree of overestimation in the rank–based outperformance. This figure presents the average 
values of the overestimation for the hedge funds in our database ranked by decreasing alpha and grouped in 50 buckets. The left (right) plot displays the overestimation in 
percentile–rank estimates of the outperformance (underperformance) ratio. Peer performance ratios used to compute ̂  δ+ and ̂  δ− are based on the universe of funds pursuing 




























with Panel E, we effectively find suggestive evidence that a better
out–of–sample performance is obtained by restricting the funds to
the same investment style. This confirms our recommendation to
control for fund style in the peer analysis and is consistent with
Hunter et al. (2014) . A detailed investigation of the optimal choice
of a peer group is an interesting avenue for further research. 16 
Overall, we find that the outperformance ratio is effectively able
to select the top performing hedge funds. In the next section, we
analyze this outcome in further detail and use multivariate regres-
sion techniques to compare the complementarity with alternative
peer performance measures and to control for other influences in
the analysis of the predictive power of the outperformance ratio
for forecasting fund performance over the next one–, two– and
four quarters. 16 As an alternative to defining peers based on the reported investment style, one 
could use a data–driven procedure to identify peer funds. Broadly speaking, we can 
distinguish two classes of data–driven procedures to identify peer funds. One ap- 
proach uses historical returns and fund characteristics ( e.g. , age, size, fund style and 
obtains the peer funds through cluster analysis and fund matching algorithms, or 
via an analysis of the coefficients in a regression of fund returns on benchmark in- 
ices (see, e.g. , Brown and Goetzmann, 1997 ). The second approach classifies funds 
ased on the highest percentage of overlap in fund holdings ( Cremers and Peta- 
jisto, 2009 ). In practice, investors usually define the peer funds as the set of other 
funds in a portfolio, funds in a screening list of analysts ( e.g. , those followed by the 









a  .5. Complementarity of ̂ π+ to alternative peer performance 
easures 
Various alternatives exist to create quintile portfolios in terms
f outperforming funds. We examine now the added value of
ombining the information in the outperformance ratio–based top
uintile portfolio with quintile portfolios constructed using other
erformance measures. We verify the complementarity in terms of
he difference in composition, as well as in a regression analysis
uantifying the expected additional return the hedge fund yields
hen belonging to the top quintile portfolio, compared with the
eference hedge fund that is not included in the top quintile port-
olio. 
We consider four alternative fund performance–based selection
easures: (i) the fund’s past return capturing the “hot hands ef-
ect” (see Agarwal and Naik, 20 0 0 ), (ii) the fund’s alpha , (iii) the
und’s relative alpha , and (iv) the fund’s peer alpha . The fund’s rela-
ive alpha ( ̂  αrel ), defined by Jagannathan et al. (2010) , is computed
s the OLS estimate of the intercept obtained in the regression of
he hedge fund’s returns on the US aggregate market factor and the
elf–reported style factor as explanatory variables together with an
dditional variable selected by Bayesian information criterion (BIC)
mong the (lagged) values of HFRI indices. 17 Finally, the peer alpha17 Overall, we use the 37 HFRI style factors corresponding to 
the HFR styles described in https://www.hedgefundresearch.com/ 
hfr- hedge- fund- strategy- classification- system . 
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Table 4 
Out–of–sample performance results of the quintile portfolios. 
This table presents the annualized return (Mean, in percent), volatility (Std, in percent), Sharpe ratio and nine–factor model alpha (in per- 
cent) of the quarterly rebalanced portfolios invested in the top and bottom quintile of the hedge funds sorted by various peer performance 
measures. When the investment horizon H is semi-annual (S) or annual (A), funds entering the portfolio at year–quarter q can only be 
disinvested in year–quarter q + 2 and q + 4 , respectively. Panel A reports results for portfolios invested in top quintiles of the hedge funds 
ranked on their outperformance ( ̂  π+ ) and underperformance ratios ( ̂  π−) computed using funds with the same strategy as peers. Panels B 
and C report results for portfolios invested in the bottom and top quintile of the hedge funds ranked on their alpha ( ̂  α) and ranked on 
their alpha for which the t –statistic is higher than two in absolute values, respectively. Panel D reports results for portfolios invested in the 
bottom and top quintile of the hedge funds ranked on their alpha t –statistic. Panel E reports results for portfolios invested in the quintile 
of the hedge funds ranked on their outperformance and underperformance ratios computed using all funds in the universe as peers. Peer 
performance measures are computed on five–year rolling samples of monthly net returns. Column ”Alpha” reports the annualized quarterly 
alpha (in percent) of the portfolios excess return against the nine–factor model. The symbols ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical significance 
of the strategy’s alpha at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard error 
estimators. The out–of–sample evaluation ranges from 2005–Q1 to 2014–Q2 for a total of 38 rebalancing dates. See Section 3.4 for details. 
Equally–weighted portfolios Value–weighted portfolios 
H Quintile Mean Std Sharpe Alpha Mean Std Sharpe Alpha 
Panel A: Portfolio sorts using the outperformance and underperformance ratio 
Q Top ̂  π+ 9.39 8.14 1.15 5.52 ∗∗∗ 7.54 8.17 0.92 3.72 ∗∗
Q Top ̂  π− 4.74 10.59 0.45 0.01 3.81 9.05 0.42 0.24 
S Top ̂  π+ 8.80 7.86 1.12 4.92 ∗∗∗ 7.08 7.88 0.90 3.38 ∗∗
S Top ̂  π− 5.53 9.99 0.55 0.90 4.73 8.59 0.55 1.36 
A Top ̂  π+ 7.99 7.95 1.01 4.16 ∗∗ 6.56 8.03 0.82 2.98 ∗
A Top ̂  π− 5.77 8.82 0.65 1.15 5.02 7.66 0.66 1.57 
Panel B: Portfolio sorts using alpha 
Q Top 8.98 8.82 1.02 4.78 ∗∗ 6.83 8.47 0.81 2.64 
Q Bottom 5.80 11.72 0.49 0.13 5.66 10.77 0.53 0.86 
S Top 8.68 8.53 1.02 4.47 ∗∗ 6.63 8.26 0.80 2.60 
S Bottom 6.54 11.08 0.59 0.93 6.77 9.89 0.68 2.27 
A Top 7.88 8.45 0.93 3.72 ∗∗ 6.12 8.40 0.73 2.34 
A Bottom 6.75 9.65 0.70 1.21 6.79 8.71 0.78 2.18 ∗
Panel C: Portfolio sorts using significant alpha (| t –stat| > 2) 
Q Top 7.01 6.15 1.14 4.27 ∗∗∗ 6.20 6.17 1.00 3.37 ∗∗
Q Bottom 5.46 8.95 0.61 0.93 5.44 8.16 0.67 1.59 
S Top 6.89 5.84 1.18 4.20 ∗∗∗ 6.00 6.07 0.99 3.36 ∗∗
S Bottom 5.81 8.82 0.66 1.33 5.48 8.16 0.67 1.56 
A Top 6.31 5.78 1.09 3.58 ∗∗∗ 5.48 6.13 0.89 2.76 ∗∗
A Bottom 5.75 8.36 0.69 1.25 5.41 7.89 0.69 1.44 
Panel D: Portfolio sorts using alpha t –stat 
Q Top 7.17 5.62 1.27 4.55 ∗∗∗ 6.05 6.24 0.97 3.22 ∗∗
Q Bottom 5.70 10.83 0.53 0.25 5.74 9.22 0.62 1.23 
S Top 6.83 5.38 1.27 4.27 ∗∗∗ 5.81 5.98 0.97 3.16 ∗∗
S Bottom 6.16 10.41 0.59 0.70 6.21 8.96 0.69 1.74 
A Top 6.18 5.56 1.11 3.58 ∗∗∗ 5.37 6.16 0.87 2.71 ∗∗
A Bottom 6.39 9.25 0.69 1.04 6.13 7.95 0.77 1.77 ∗
Panel E: Portfolio sorts using peer ratios computed with all funds as peers 
Q Top ̂  π+ 8.87 7.86 1.13 5.00 ∗∗∗ 6.76 7.77 0.87 2.97 ∗
Q Top ̂  π− 5.5 10.74 0.51 0.37 5.27 9.28 0.57 1.16 
S Top ̂  π+ 8.30 7.60 1.09 4.48 ∗∗∗ 6.41 7.54 0.85 2.78 ∗
S Top ̂  π− 6.13 10.29 0.60 1.03 6.14 8.88 0.69 2.23 ∗
A Top ̂  π+ 7.51 7.65 0.98 3.81 ∗∗ 5.92 7.72 0.77 2.48 


























b   ̂
 αpeer ), as suggested by Hunter et al. (2014) , is the OLS estimate
f the intercept of the same regression as used to obtain the fund’s
lpha, except that the factor corresponding to the average return of
he funds in the same investment style is included as an active peer
enchmark factor. 18 
A necessary condition for complementarity of the top quintile
ortfolios is that there is no perfect overlap in their composition.
e examine this for the outperformance ratio by reporting the18 We also tested alternatives using the distinctiveness and the selectivity peer per- 
ormance measures proposed by Sun et al. (2012) and Amihud and Goyenko (2013) , 
espectively. These measures associate outperformance to funds for which the track 
ecord or returns cannot be explained by their peer returns or the factor model. 
hey do not take the direction of the performance differential into account, which, 
nder the model of Titman and Tiu (2011) can be optimal when funds only take ac- 
ive positions when they have positive skills. Several empirical tests on our sample 
f hedge funds indicate, however, that in practice these measures have no signifi- 
antly positive association with future fund performance. To save space, we there- 
ore, focus on the peer performance measures that do take the direction of the rel- 










r  ercentage of funds that belong to the top quintile portfolio con-
tructed using the alternative measures, when they also belong to
he top quintile portfolio for the outperformance ratio. We com-
ute this percentage for each quarter in our sample. The overlap
s the highest for the fund’s alpha measure. It varies between 75%
nd 90% with an average value of 82%. The lowest overlap is with
espect to the fund’s lagged return, for which the overlap ranges
etween 15% and 40% with an average value of 30%. For the rela-
ive and peer alpha, we find that the overlap with the outperfor-
ance ratio–based top quintile portfolio is similar. In both cases, it
s on average 70%, and the range is between 55% and 80%. 
We use regression methods to quantify the stand–alone pre-
ictive value of the individual portfolio sorts when forecasting the
und’s (risk–adjusted) return, as well as the incremental predictive
alue of the portfolio sorts using the outperformance ratio, as com-
ared to the use of alternative peer performance measures. The
ariable to forecast, denoted by Y i, q , is either the fund i ’s future
eturn or the future risk–adjusted excess return, computed as the








































































































m  fund’s return in excess of the risk–free rate, and expressed in units
per risk by dividing it by the standard deviation of the preceding
12 monthly returns. The future returns are computed over a quar-
terly, semi–annual and annual horizon. Because of the high overlap
between the top quintile alpha portfolio funds and the top quintile
outperformance ratio funds, and to avoid identification issues due
to quasi–multicollinearity, we do not consider the complementar-
ity with respect to the fund’s alpha in the regression analysis. 
The models we estimate to predict, at year–quarter q , the future
performance Y i, q , are nested in the following specification: 
 i,q = ζq + β1 T Q ̂  π+ i,q + β2 T Q R i,q + β3 T Q ̂  α
rel 
i,q + β4 T Q ̂  α
peer 
i,q 
+ γ ′ CTRL i,q + ε i,q , (14)
where T Q ̂  π
+ 
i,q 
is the dummy variable indicating that fund i be-
longs to the 20% funds with highest outperformance ratio in year–
quarter q . The variables T Q R 
i,q 
, T Q ̂  α
rel 
i,q 




similarly, but using the alternative performance measure. 19 We use
εi, q to denote the error term, and CTRL i,q to refer to the inclusion
of control variables. As control variables, we include the assets un-
der management (in logarithm), the fund’s age (in months, since
inception), and the fund’s capital inflow (in thousand USD) defined
by Fung et al. (2008) . We further control for risk in the return pre-
diction model by including the fund’s return volatility (computed
as the standard deviation over the last twelve months) and the
time–invariant fund characteristics: 
CTRL i,q ≡
(
LAUM i,q , AGE i,q , F i,q , VOL i,q , EH i , MA i , RV i , MF i , PF i , LEV i , 
HUR i , HWM i ) 
′ 
, 
where EH i , MA i and RV i are dummies indicating the Equity Hedge,
Macro, and Relative Value hedge fund styles (Event–Driven is the
reference category). 20 MF i and PF i are the fund’s management and
performance fees. The indicator variable LEV i is one if the fund is
allowed to use leverage. HUR i is another dummy variable, which
indicates the presence of a required rate of return that the fund
manager needs to obtain before collecting the performance fee.
The dummy variable HWM i indicates that the fund has a high
watermark provision that requires the manager to make up past
deficits before earning the incentive fee. All of these variables
are standard in previous studies of fund performance (see, e.g. ,
Liang, 1999 ). 
Let us first discuss the stand–alone predictive value of being a
top quintile performing fund, as estimated by the univariate re-




The corresponding coefficient β • expresses then the predicted gain
in (risk–adjusted excess) return when the fund belongs to the top
quintile portfolio, compared to the funds that do not belong to the
top quintile portfolio. The OLS estimation results are reported in
the left (resp. right) part of Table 5 , when the variable of interest is
the quarterly (Panel A), semi–annual (Panel B) and annual (Panel C)
fund return (resp. risk–adjusted excess return). Based on the mag-
nitude of the coefficient and the adjusted R 2 of the predictive re-
gressions, we find that the top quintile dummy using the outper-
formance ratio is always the second best. For forecasting the re-
turn, the top momentum quintile is best, while for forecasting the
risk–adjusted return, the top peer alpha quintile yields the highest
increase in risk–adjusted return. The top quintile based on the out-
performance ratio thus strikes a balance between the objectives of19 All dummies are computed using quarterly performance measures, except for 
T Q R 
i,q −1 , which is the dummy for the funds with the highest return over the past 1, 
2 and 4 quarters when Y i, q is the (risk–adjusted) return over the quarterly, semi–
annual and annual horizon, respectively. 
20 All hedge funds considered are US funds, so we do not include a dummy vari- 






chieving both a high expected return and a high risk–adjusted ex-
ected return. We further find that the expected increases in (risk–
djusted) expected return is higher for longer horizons, which is
onsistent with the time–scaling of expected returns over longer
orizons. 
In practice, we recommend to use the outperformance ratio in
ombination with other predictors of (risk–adjusted) fund perfor-
ance. This advice follows from our finding that the outperfor-
ance ratio has incremental predictive value when included in
ultivariate regressions. Consider first the multivariate regressions
esults in Table 5 with two quintile portfolio dummies and no
ther control variables. Suppose the corresponding coefficients are
1 and β2 . In case of complementarity, both β1 and β2 need to
e positive such that the predicted gain in (risk–adjusted) excess
eturn (namely β1 + β2 ) is higher than the expected gain when
he fund belongs to only one of the top quintile portfolios. This
ypothesis is confirmed by estimates reported in Table 5 . In all
odels considered, the estimates of β1 and β2 are positive and,
xcept for the annual investment horizon, statistically significant.
his thus indicates that the fund’s outperformance ratio, the fund’s
agged return, and the fund’s relative and peer alphas are good pre-
ictors of future fund performance, and that the predictive power
f one is not cannibalized by the others. 
The previous analysis indicates that the ability of hedge funds
o outperform their peers is too complex to be captured by only
 single performance measure. In addition to the use of multiple
op quintile dummies, other variables such as the fund size and
isk are relevant. For brevity, we focus the presentation of our re-
ults to the forecasting at the quarterly prediction horizon. 21 Re-
ults are reported in Table 6 . Note that fund size and the fund’s
erformance fee have significant negative effects on future firm
net) return performance. For our sample, we find that the higher
he fund risk, the higher the predicted return, but the lower is the
xpected risk–adjusted return. These results are in line with pre-
ious research. Note also that all the coefficients on the top quin-
ile portfolio dummies are positive and significant at the 1% sig-
ificance level. The main take–away finding of Table 6 is thus that
ncluding those extra control variables does not remove the statis-
ical significance of the finding that a fund belonging to the top
uintile portfolio in terms of the outperformance ratio can be ex-
ected to have a higher (risk–adjusted) return. Further, this effect
s not explained by the usual predictors of fund performance. 
.6. Determinants of peer performance 
In this section, we conduct additional tests to verify well–
stablished theories about the effects of fund size and fund age
n the peer performance of hedge funds. Regarding fund size, we
xpect to find decreasing returns to scale in active management,
nd thus that fund size deteriorates the peer performance of hedge
unds, that is, it decreases the outperformance ratio and increases
he underperformance ratio. Chen et al. (2004) attribute the disec-
nomy of scale to the fact that small hedge funds have more op-
ortunities to deploy their talent, especially when investing in less
iquid assets. 
A second channel through which fund size impacts on peer
erformance is reputation risk, which is highest for funds with
oth a long track record and a large amount of assets under
anagement. In fact, in addition to performance–based compen-
ation, hedge funds receive compensation in the form of man-
gement fees, which are directly related to fund size. If there21 Similar results are obtained at the semi–annual forecasting horizon. Like for the 
egression without the control variables, the statistical evidence for the comple- 
entarity of the outperformance ratio and the alternative measure disappears at 
he annual forecasting horizon. 
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Table 5 
Return prediction results. 
This table presents the regression results of the prediction model (14) without control variables when the dependent variable is either the future net return (left part) or the 
future risk–adjusted excess return (right part). The model aims at quantifying the stand–alone predictive value ( i.e. , univariate regressions) and the incremental predictive 
value ( i.e. , multivariate regressions) that a fund is in the top quintile portfolio according to the fund’s outperformance ratio ( T Q ̂  π
+ 
), the fund’s lagged return ( TQ R ), the fund’s 
relative alpha ( T Q ̂ α
rel 
), and the fund’s peer alpha ( T Q ̂ α
peer 
). The respective regression coefficients are to be interpreted as expected gains in performance when the fund 
belongs to the top quintile portfolio, compared to the reference group of hedge funds that do not belong to either of the top quintile groups included in the regression. 
Panel A reports results for the quarterly prediction horizon, Panel B for the semi–annual horizon and Panel C for the annual horizon. Robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. The symbols ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Adj R 2 reports the (adjusted) R–squared (in percent). See 
Section 3.5 for details. 
Return Risk–adjusted excess return 
Univariate regressions Multivariate regressions Univariate regressions Multivariate regressions 
Panel A: Quarterly prediction horizon 
T Q ̂  π
+ 
0.83 ∗∗∗ 0.62 ∗∗∗ 0.75 ∗∗∗ 0.71 ∗∗∗ 0.25 ∗∗∗ 0.24 ∗∗∗ 0.15 ∗∗∗ 0.14 ∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.10) (0.14) (0.14) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
TQ R 1.90 ∗∗∗ 1.83 ∗∗∗ 1.86 ∗∗∗ 1.86 ∗∗∗ 0.10 ∗∗∗ 0.08 ∗∗∗ 0.08 ∗∗∗ 0.08 ∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
T Q ̂ α
rel 
0.59 ∗∗∗ 0.40 ∗∗∗ 0.13 0.25 ∗∗∗ 0.24 ∗∗∗ 0.16 ∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
T Q ̂ α
peer 
0.64 ∗∗∗ 0.45 ∗∗∗ 0.20 0.26 ∗∗∗ 0.25 ∗∗∗ 0.18 ∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Adj R 2 0.16 0.84 0.08 0.09 0.93 0.88 0.89 0.16 0.16 0.51 0.09 0.51 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.61 0.63 0.66 
Panel B: Semi–annual prediction horizon 
T Q ̂  π
+ 
1.18 ∗∗∗ 0.81 ∗∗∗ 1.03 ∗∗∗ 1.00 ∗∗∗ 0.29 ∗∗∗ 0.27 ∗∗∗ 0.19 ∗∗∗ 0.18 ∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.22) (0.26) (0.26) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
TQ R 2.49 ∗∗∗ 2.36 ∗∗∗ 2.41 ∗∗∗ 2.41 ∗∗∗ 0.19 ∗∗∗ 0.14 ∗∗∗ 0.15 ∗∗∗ 0.15 ∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
T Q ̂ α
rel 
0.87 ∗∗∗ 0.54 ∗∗ 0.25 0.29 ∗∗∗ 0.27 ∗∗∗ 0.17 ∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.23) (0.27) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
T Q ̂ α
peer 
0.90 ∗∗∗ 0.59 ∗∗∗ 0.28 0.29 ∗∗∗ 0.27 ∗∗∗ 0.18 ∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.22) (0.27) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Adj R 2 0.12 0.56 0.07 0.07 0.62 0.59 0.59 0.13 0.13 0.53 0.21 0.51 0.52 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.64 0.64 
Panel C: Annual prediction horizon 
T Q ̂  π
+ 
1.00 ∗∗ 0.49 0.72 0.74 0.26 ∗∗∗ 0.23 ∗∗∗ 0.16 ∗∗ 0.16 ∗∗
(0.44) (0.44) (0.51) (0.51) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
TQ R 2.45 ∗∗∗ 2.34 ∗∗∗ 2.36 ∗∗∗ 2.37 ∗∗∗ 0.17 ∗∗∗ 0.12 ∗∗∗ 0.13 ∗∗∗ 0.13 ∗∗∗
(0.40) (0.41) (0.40) (0.40) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
T Q ̂ α
rel 
0.91 ∗∗ 0.45 0.47 0.26 ∗∗∗ 0.23 ∗∗∗ 0.16 ∗∗
(0.45) (0.45) (0.52) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
T Q ̂ α
peer 
0.88 ∗ 0.42 0.42 0.25 ∗∗∗ 0.23 ∗∗∗ 0.16 ∗∗
(0.45) (0.45) (0.53) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 

































22 A potentially more efficient alternative to the equation–by–equation estimation 




and ̂ π0 
i 
is to estimate them jointly by maximum likelihood under a 
Dirichlet distribution that considers the fact that the three ratios add up to unity. 
Another alternative is to specify a multinomial logit approach for the out–, equal–, 
or underperformance status of each pair of funds. However, these multivariate mod- 
els pose considerable econometric challenges regarding the model for the depen- 
dence between the peer performance ratios. 
23 We also considered estimating the model by panel estimation methods by as- 
suming that the slope coefficients are identical across the 39 samples and includ- 
ing fund fixed effects. However, because of the nonlinear regression specification, 
this requires the estimation of the fixed effects and slope coefficients jointly, which 
leads to the curse of dimensionality during the estimation process. The alternative 
to linearizing the regression by using G −1 ( ̂  π •
i,q 
) is also not possible because of the 
non–negligible proportion of funds for which ̂  π • is exactly one. re more assets under management, the hedge fund risks losing
ore due to a loss of reputation when failing unconventionally.
he herding models proposed by Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and
raham (1999) predict that managers with high reputation and
alary (which are associated with higher assets under manage-
ent) tend to herd more. This career hypothesis has been recently
onfirmed by Boyson (2010) based on hedge fund data. 
We use a nonlinear regression framework to test these hypothe-
es in our longitudinal time series of quarterly updated peer per-




and ̂ π0 
i,q 
( q = 1 , . . . , 39 ). Under this ap-
roach, the expectation of the peer performance ratio is modeled
s a logistic function of the fund’s assets under management at
he end of the preceding quarter (in logarithm, LAUM i,q −1 ), the age
f the fund at the end of the preceding quarter ( i.e. , time since
nception in months, AGE i,q −1 ), an interaction term ( i.e. , IT i,q −1 ≡
AUM i,q −1 × AGE i,q −1 ), and control variables: 
̂ •
i,q = G 
(
β0 ,q + β1 ,q LAUM i,q −1 + β2 ,q AGE i,q −1 + β3 ,q IT i,q −1 
+ γ ′ q CTRL i 
)
+ ε i,q , (15) 
here G ( · ) is the logistic function, εi, q is the error term,
q is a (8 × 1) vector of parameters for the control variables
TRL i ≡
(
EH i , MA i , RV i , MF i , PF i , LEV i , HUR i , HWM i 
)′ 
, as defined in
ection 3.5 . The dependent variable ̂ π •
i,q 
is either the outperformance ratiô + 
i,q 
, the underperformance ratio ̂ π−
i,q 
, or the equal–performance
atio ̂ π0 
i,q 
of fund i at quarter q . 22 Model (15) is estimated by
onlinear least squares for each of the 39 estimation samples
eparately. 23 The regression results are presented in Panel A of
able 7 for the separate models explaining the outperformance ra-
io (Columns 2–5), the underperformance ratio (Columns 6–9), and
he equal–performance ratio (Columns 10–13). For each dependent
ariable, we report the average value (over the 39 samples) of the
onlinear regression coefficients and the percentage of the sam-
les for which the estimated coefficient is significantly differenti,q 
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Table 6 
Return prediction results with control variables. 
This table presents the regression results of the return prediction model (14) for the quarterly prediction horizon. The dependent variable 
is either the quarterly net return (left part) or the quarterly risk–adjusted excess return (right part) of hedge fund i at the end of quarter 
q . The model aims at quantifying the complementarity of the information value that a fund is in the top quintile portfolio according to 
the fund’s outperformance ratio ( T Q ̂  π
+ 
), the fund’s lagged return ( TQ R ), the fund’s relative alpha ( T Q ̂ α
rel 
), and (iii) the fund’s peer alpha 
( T Q ̂ α
peer 
). The control variables are the fund’s asset under management (in logarithm, LAUM ), the fund’s age AGE , the fund’s capital inflow 
F (in thousand USD), the fund’s return volatility (computed as the standard deviation over the last twelve months, VOL ). Variables EH , 
MA , and RV are dummies indicating the Equity Hedge, Macro, and Relative Value hedge fund styles, respectively. MF and PF are the fund’s 
management and performance fees. LEV , HUR , and HWM are dummy variables indicating that the fund uses leverage, hurdle rate, and high 
watermark provision, respectively. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The symbols ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Adj R 2 reports the adjusted R–squared. See Section 3.5 for details. 
Return Risk–adjusted excess return 
T Q ̂  π
+ 
0.57 ∗∗∗ 0.46 ∗∗∗ 0.36 ∗∗∗ 0.30 ∗∗ 0.24 ∗∗∗ 0.22 ∗∗∗ 0.13 ∗∗∗ 0.11 ∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
TQ R 1.16 ∗∗∗ 0.19 ∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.02) 
T Q ̂ α
rel 
0.35 ∗∗∗ 0.18 ∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.03) 
T Q ̂ α
peer 
0.44 ∗∗∗ 0.20 ∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.03) 
LAUM −0 . 06 ∗∗ −0 . 06 ∗∗ −0 . 06 ∗∗ −0 . 06 ∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
AGE −0 . 02 ∗ −0 . 01 ∗ −0.01 −0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
F −0.25 −0.21 −0.25 −0.25 −0.06 −0.06 −0.07 −0.07 
(0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
VOL 0.44 ∗∗∗ 0.40 ∗∗∗ 0.44 ∗∗∗ 0.45 ∗∗∗ −0 . 04 ∗∗∗ −0 . 04 ∗∗∗ −0 . 04 ∗∗∗ −0 . 04 ∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
EH 0.47 ∗∗∗ 0.50 ∗∗∗ 0.49 ∗∗∗ 0.49 ∗∗∗ 0.22 ∗∗∗ 0.23 ∗∗∗ 0.23 ∗∗∗ 0.23 ∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
MA −0 . 88 ∗∗∗ −0 . 84 ∗∗∗ −0 . 88 ∗∗∗ −0 . 89 ∗∗∗ −0 . 22 ∗∗∗ −0 . 22 ∗∗∗ −0 . 23 ∗∗∗ −0 . 23 ∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
RV 0.53 ∗∗∗ 0.56 ∗∗∗ 0.54 ∗∗∗ 0.54 ∗∗∗ 0.40 ∗∗∗ 0.40 ∗∗∗ 0.40 ∗∗∗ 0.40 ∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
MF −5.63 −6.12 −5.96 −6.00 −0.17 −0.25 −0.34 −0.34 
(7.12) (6.90) (7.09) (7.08) (3.07) (3.06) (3.06) (3.05) 
PF −1 . 53 ∗ −1 . 43 ∗ −1 . 68 ∗ −1 . 72 ∗∗ −0.13 −0.11 −0.21 −0.21 
(0.87) (0.85) (0.87) (0.87) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) 
LEV −0.11 −0.11 −0.11 −0.11 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
HUR 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.09 ∗ 0.08 ∗ 0.09 ∗ 0.09 ∗
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
HWM 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
(0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 












































b  from zero, significantly positive, and significantly negative at the
5% level, respectively. 
Let us first discuss the effects of fund size, fund age, and
the interaction effect between fund size and fund age. For the
outperformance ratio, we find that for 77% of the samples, the co-
efficient of fund size is significantly negative. The interaction ef-
fect between fund size and fund age is not significantly different
from zero in 87% of the samples. It follows that consistent with the
presence of decreasing returns to scale, fund size leads to a deteri-
oration in the fund’s outperformance ratio. In 33% of the samples,
fund age is associated with a lower outperformance ratio. 
For the underperformance ratio, the effects of fund size and
fund age are more complex because the interaction variable be-
tween fund age and fund size is significantly negative in 67% of the
samples. We find that the coefficient on fund size and fund age is
significantly positive for 62% and 97% of the samples, respectively,
while the coefficient on the interaction variable between fund size
and fund age is significantly negative for 67% of the samples. It
follows that we have the following three ceteris paribus interpreta-
tions. First, for two funds of the same size, the oldest fund tends
to have a higher underperformance ratio. This result confirms the
analysis of Aggarwal and Jorion (2010) who find that hedge funds
tend to add value in their early years and that thereafter the per-ormance tends to deteriorate in a nonlinear manner. Second, we
ave that for two funds of the same age, the largest fund tends
o have the highest underperformance ratio. Third, we find that
he increase in the underperformance ratio for larger (resp. older)
unds is partly compensated for by the age (resp. size) of the fund.
n other words, large funds with a long track tend to underperform
ess than their younger peers with same fund size. 
Finally, for the equal–performance ratio, the interaction is al-
ost never significant, whereas fund size has a positive impact on
he equal–performance ratio. These two results are consistent with
he prediction that, because of decreasing returns to scale in ac-
ive investment strategies, larger funds have fewer opportunities
o outperform their smaller peers. 
Regarding the fund characteristics, we find that funds with an
quity Hedge and Macro investment style tend to have a higher
qual–performance ratio and a lower out– and underperformance
atio than the Event–Driven funds. More interestingly, for 46% and
7% of the samples, the value of the performance and management
ee is associated with a higher outperformance ratio. Similarly, for
ost of the samples, the level of the fee decreases the underper-
ormance ratio. Since we compute these ratios on net returns, it
ollows that for our universe of hedge funds, higher fees tends to
e associated with better performing funds, which is consistent
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Table 7 
Nonlinear regression analysis of the cross–section of hedge funds’ peer performance ratios. 
This table presents the summary of the estimation results for the nonlinear model (15) with the dependent variable ̂  π • and ̂  δ• (computed 
over the 39 samples). Panel A reports results for peer ratios computed using funds with the same strategy as peers ( i.e. , ̂ π+ , ̂  π− and ̂  π0 ). 
Panel B reports results for the determinants of the overestimation in outperformance and underperformance when using the percentile–
rank approach ( i.e. , ̂  δ+ and ̂  δ−). For each peer performance ratio, the table shows the average value β (over the 39 samples) of the regression 
coefficients and the percentage of samples for which the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero ( = 0), significantly positive 
( > 0), and significantly negative ( < 0) at the 5% level, respectively (where we use asymptotic standard errors for the tests). The main 
variables of interest are the fund’s assets under management (in logarithm, LAUM ), the fund’s age in months ( AGE ), and their interaction 
( IT ≡ LAUM × AGE ). The other control variables are described in Table 6 (page 38). Pseudo R 2 (in percent) reports the average of the ratio 
between the standard deviation of the errors and the standard deviation of the dependent variable. See Section 3.6 for details. 
Panel A: Determinants of peer performance ratios 
̂ π+ ̂ π− ̂ π0 
β  = 0 > 0 < 0 β  = 0 > 0 < 0 β  = 0 > 0 < 0 
Constant −1.93 100 0 100 −0.77 77 0 82 0.13 23 23 13 
LAUM −0.10 72 0 77 0.08 46 62 5 0.04 36 46 0 
AGE −0.04 28 0 33 0.07 92 97 0 −0.01 8 3 10 
IT 0.00 13 15 0 −0.01 46 0 67 0.00 5 5 3 
EH −0.26 59 5 62 −0.44 85 0 85 0.48 82 85 0 
MA −0.65 54 0 56 −0.53 56 0 67 0.64 72 67 8 
RV 0.08 31 26 18 −0.13 23 8 38 0.01 51 31 26 
MF 37.81 79 87 0 −31.54 69 0 69 −3.58 13 3 28 
PF 1.69 51 46 10 −1.66 38 0 51 0.01 8 5 8 
LEV −0.07 31 10 33 0.00 5 0 10 0.05 23 21 3 
HUR 0.10 33 31 10 0.11 3 13 0 −0.11 31 5 31 
HWM 0.31 21 28 0 −0.21 26 0 38 0.03 0 3 0 
Pseudo R 2 96.73 97.17 96.35 
Panel B: Determinants of the overestimation in outperformance and underperformance ̂ δ+ ̂ δ−
β  = 0 > 0 < 0 β  = 0 > 0 < 0 
Constant 0.36 97 97 0 0.93 100 100 0 
LAUM 0.03 77 85 0 −0.02 82 0 82 
AGE 0.02 56 62 0 −0.05 100 0 100 
IT 0.00 85 0 90 0.00 54 59 0 
EH 0.10 69 69 3 0.10 82 85 3 
MA 0.13 67 54 15 0.14 72 67 10 
RV −0.02 54 28 33 −0.04 38 5 33 
MF 1.13 5 10 0 1.64 23 28 3 
PF 0.57 64 72 0 0.05 3 8 0 
LEV 0.01 0 5 0 −0.01 0 0 5 
HUR 0.01 0 3 0 0.00 0 0 3 
HWM −0.01 3 3 3 −0.03 23 0 28 

















































o  ith the equilibrium argument in Berk and Green (2004) that the
killed managers are hired by the funds that charge higher fees. 
.7. Fund characteristics and overestimation in percentile rank–based 
ut– and underperformance 
This paper warns against the use of percentile ranks when an-
lyzing outperformance and underperformance. Since they ignore
he presence of equal performance, they tend to be inflated. In this
ection, we refine that result and discuss the fund properties for
hich we can expect the inflation to be higher. Note first that the
verestimation of outperformance in the percentile–rank approach
s caused by the large number of instances where the point es-
imate indicates outperformance while in fact the funds performs
qually well or underperforms. It follows that the expected over-
stimation in outperformance, that is, ̂ δ+ 
i 
in (12) , is an increasing
unction of the value of the equal–performance and underperfor-
ance ratio. The higher the latter, the larger is the number of ex-
ected false positives. It then follows that ̂ δ+ 
i 
is positively affected
y the factors that lead to a higher value of the equal–performance
nd underperformance ratio. Since a higher value of the equal–
erformance and underperformance ratio leads to a lower value
f the outperformance ratio, it follows also mechanically that vari-
bles associated with a higher outperformance ratio tend to lead to
 lower value of ̂ δ+ 
i 
. Similarly, ̂ δ−
i 
in (13) is positively affected by
he factors that lead to a higher value of the equal–performancend outperformance ratio, and a lower value of the underperfor-
ance ratio. 
This intuition is confirmed in Panel B of Table 7 , where we





und characteristics, using the same nonlinear regression model




∈ [ −1 , 1] is ˜ G (·) ≡ −1 + 2 G (·) instead of the logistic func-
ion G ( · ). Since fund size and fund age lead to a larger under-
erformance ratio and lower outperformance ratio, and fund size
lso increases the equal–performance ratio, we find that the per-
entile rank–based outperformance ratio is inflated for large and
ld funds. A similar reasoning explains why we find a positive co-
fficient for most of the Equity Hedge and Macro funds (relatively
o Event–Driven funds). For the performance fee, we find that the
ositive effect on the outperformance ratio dominates and leads to
 higher value of ̂ δ+ 
i 
. It thus seems that a higher performance fee
s associated with a higher outperformance ratio, but less than the
ercentile–rank approach would signal. 
Similar conclusions hold for the interpretation of the
ercentile–rank based estimates of the underperformance pa-
ameter. As a consequence of the positive effect of fund age
nd size on the equal–performance ratio and underperformance
atio, and negative effect on the outperformance ratio, we find
hat for (almost) all samples, the percentile–rank based approach
verestimates underperformance for young and small funds. This














































































































corresponds to our previous finding that the underperformance
ratio is higher for the old and large funds, implying that the
overestimation ( i.e. , the spread between the rank–based approach
and the underperformance ratio) is smaller for these funds. This
effect is mitigated in 59% of the samples, where there is a positive
interaction effect between fund size and fund age. While these
results are indicative of the direction of overestimation in outper-
formance and underperformance using the percentile rank–based
approach, they do not quantify the exact error. Therefore, the
bottom line recommendation of the analysis is to account for false
discoveries in peer performance and use the proposed triplet of








The peer performance of active fund managers is a topic
of importance for both academics and practitioners. Inspired by
Barras et al. (2010) , we argue that the workhorse approach of eval-
uating peer performance by simply ranking funds on their esti-
mated alpha is prone to suffer from false discoveries: detection
of outperformance or underperformance when in reality the funds
have the same performance. We introduce a triple–layered peer
performance evaluation framework, which, by design, includes the
possibility that many fund managers perform equally well as their
peers. In our framework, the population of peer funds is seg-
mented into those with truly equal–performance, those that out-
perform, and those that underperform. We propose a closed–form
non–parametric estimator for the corresponding equal–, out–, and
underperformance ratios. 
We use the proposed peer performance evaluation framework
to analyze the peer performance of the Equity Hedge, Event–
Driven, Macro, and Relative Value hedge funds in the Hedge Fund
Research database over a period ranging from January 20 0 0 to June
2014. The peer group is defined as the set of hedge funds pursuing
the same investment style. We show that percentile–rank analyses
of out– and underperformance overestimate the outperformance of
the funds with a relatively good ranking and overestimate the un-
derperformance of the funds with a worse ranking. An extensive
out–of–sample evaluation illustrates the economic value of con-
trolling for false discoveries when using the fund’s outperformance
ratio rather than the fund’s alpha for constructing top quintile in-
vestment portfolios. Finally, we validate the proposed methodology
also by verifying that the cross-sectional variation in the peer per-
formance ratios is consistent with the life–cycle theory of Berk and
Green (2004) and Getmansky (2012) . 
We thus find the peer performance ratios to be a useful addi-
tion to the battery of performance statistics used by investors. By
controlling for both relative performance using pairwise tests and
adjusting for false discoveries, they provide a unique assessment
of the peer performance, which has been shown to be incremental
to the existing measures. The proposed peer performance screen-
ing plots are useful for both ex–ante selection of funds and ex–post
evaluation of their relative performance. In order to promote its
use in practice, we have released the open source statistical pack-
age “PeerPerformance” ( Ardia and Boudt, 2017 ) that offers all the
functionality documented in this article. 
Our research can be extended in various ways. Throughout the
paper, we fix the peer group as the funds in the universe with
the same investment style. An interesting topic for further research
could be to exploit this degree of freedom and determine the def-
inition of the peer group for which the peer performance ratios
are most predictive of future fund performance. More generally,
the scope of our proposed peer performance framework extends
beyond the analysis of hedge fund performance. Additional appli-
cations include the selection of trading rules, as in Bajgrowicz andcaillet (2012) , the analysis of herding among investment profes-
ionals, and evaluations of the peer universes used in hedging. 
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ppendix A. Bias correction factor 
The bias correction factor is needed because of the truncation,
hich ensures that ̂ π0 
i 
belongs to the feasible space [0, 1]. Let˜ 0 
i 




be the estimator without a correction factor: 
˜ 0 
i ≡ min 
{̂ p 0 i , 1 } , 
ith: 
̂ p 0 i ≡ 1 n 
∑ 
j  = i I{ ̂  p i − j ≥ λi } 
(1 − λi ) 
. 
hen there is no estimation error in the p –values, i.e. , ̂ p i − j ≡ 1 −
 i − j ( ̂  τi − j ) , we show that: 
 [ ̃  π0 i ] = h (π0 i ) , (A.1)
ith: 
 (π0 i ) ≡ π0 i + s i (−φ(k ) + k (1 − (k ))) , (A.2)





(n −n λi 
i 
) 








, and where φ and
are the normal density and the cumulative normal distribution,
espectively. 
Since ˜ π0 
i 
does not estimate π0 
i 
but h (π0 
i 
) , we use h −1 ( ̃  π0 
i 
)
o estimate π0 
i 
. Equivalently, we define the correction factor c 0 
i 
in
9) as c 0 
i 
≡ h −1 ( ̃  π0 
i 
) / ̃  π0 
i 
. 
Intuitively, the results in (A .1) –(A .2) are obtained because the
andomness in ˜ π0 
i 
comes from drawing the n peer funds (with
eplacement) from a larger population, so we expect nπ0 
i 
equal–





overperforming funds. Because of the condition (7) , all p –






i ) be the expected number of p –values above λi . Then, the ac-
ual number of p –values exceeding λi , i.e. , 
∑ 
j  = i I{ ̂  p i − j ≥ λi } , fol-







(n − n λi 
i 
) /n, such that: 
̂ p 0 i d ∼ N 
(
π0 i , 
n λi 
i 
(n − n λi 
i 
) 
n 3 (1 − λi ) 2 
)
. 
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Fig. A.3. Impact of the correction factor. 
This figure presents the plot of ̃  π0 
i 
(horizontal axis; without correction factor) versus ̂  π0 
i 









































A  he expression in (A.2) then follows, since under the location–scale
epresentation of a normal random variable: 
 [ ̃  π0 i ] = π0 i + s i E [ min { Z, k } ] , 
here Z is a standard normal random variable, and using integra-
ion by parts: 
 [ min { Z, k } ] = 
∫ k 
−∞ 




φ′ (z) dz + k (1 − (k )) 
= −φ(k ) + k (1 − (k )) , 
ince φ(z) z = −φ′ (z) . 
Since the non–truncated equal–performance ratio ̂ p 0 
i 
is asymp-
otically normally distributed around the true equal–performance
atio π0 
i 
, the probability that it exceeds one (and hence the extent
f correction needed) increases when π0 
i 
increases and the vari-
nce of the estimate decreases. The latter occurs when the num-
er of peer funds decreases, ceteris paribus . We illustrate this by
 scatter–plot of the adjusted equal–performance ratio versus the
nadjusted one in Fig. A.3 for n ∈ {20, 50, 100, 500}. Since the trun-
ation leads to an underestimation of the true value, the adjusted
qual–performance value is always larger than the unadjusted one
nd the correction increases when the unadjusted estimate ˜ π0 
i 
is
arge or n is small. ppendix B. Choice of threshold value λi 
Based on Storey (2002) , Barras et al. (2010 , footnote 10) pro-
osed a bootstrap procedure for determining the value of λi in a
urely data–driven manner, which minimizes the estimated mean
quared error (MSE) of ̂ π0 
i 
. Their approach can also be applied
o our proposed peer performance analysis. More specifically, we
hoose λi such that an estimate of the MSE of ̂ π0 i (λ) defined as
 [( ̂  π0 
i 
(λ) − π0 
i 
) 2 ] is minimized. First, we compute ̂ π0 
i 
(λ) using
10) across a range of λ values (λ ∈ { 0 . 3 , 0 . 32 , . . . , 0 . 7 } ) . Second, for
ach possible value of λ, we form B bootstrap replicates of ̂ π0 
i 
(λ)
y drawing with replacement from the ( n × 1) vector of fund p –
alues. These are denoted by ̂ π0 ∗b 
i 
(λ) for b = 1 , . . . , B . Third, we
ompute the estimated MSE for each possible value of λ: 




(̂ π0 ∗b i (λ) − min 
l 
̂ π0 i (l) )2 . 
inally, we set the optimal λi such that λi ≡ arg min λ ̂ MSE (λ) . In
ur empirical application, we use the bootstrap procedure with B =
00 replicates. 
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